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The Key Factors Driving CCP Opposition to Taiwanese Independence
By Connor Warshauer

Abstract
The CCP strongly opposes a formal declaration of independence from Taiwan, and has
threatened military force should Taiwan take that step. This paper seeks to explain the
underlying reasons for the CCP’s aggressive policy. To do so, it uses a two-part methodology
composed of a comprehensive engagement with existing secondary sources from the academic
literature and four new interviews with experts in the field. The paper considers three main
explanations for China’s opposition to independence: nationalism, international geostrategic
factors, and factors of domestic politics. It concludes that domestic politics, and specifically the
CCP’s perception that independence threatens its claim to legitimacy, constitutes the main driver
of China’s foreign policy toward Taiwan.
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Introduction
Upon first glance, the key factor driving the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s
opposition to Taiwanese independence may seem fairly obvious. After all, official Chinese
policy and rhetoric make it quite clear that the CCP views Taiwan as historically being a part of
China that on principle belongs to the mainland. While this overt justification may indeed play a
large role in the internal deliberations of party leaders, such a conclusion should not be
automatic. Particularly given the significant domestic and international issues at stake in
cross-strait relations, blindly accepting the official line on the CCP’s opposition to Taiwanese
independence risks naively missing the larger issues at stake.
Nor is the endeavor to fully understand CCP motivations regarding Taiwan a trivial
academic exercise. While China’s commitment to preventing Taiwanese independence cannot be
doubted, the precise reasoning underlying that commitment has vast importance for both
appreciating Chinese strategy and crafting a strategy in response. If China sees Taiwan as
primarily a potential buffer state, efforts to significantly de-escalate tensions in the Asia-Pacific
may meaningfully reduce China’s need for aggressive posturing toward Taiwan. If, however,
China sees the importance of Taiwan as primarily cultural or historical, such efforts will have
little to no success. Similarly, China’s response to a hypothetical grand bargain (Glaser 2015)
involving Taiwan and the East and South China Seas would depend almost entirely on the main
motivations driving CCP policy in Taiwan. Ultimately, attempting to predict the CCP’s response
to any potential US strategy regarding Taiwan will remain fruitless until the party’s opposition to
independence can be fully deciphered.
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As a result, my research attempts to answer the following question: why is the Chinese
Communist Party so deeply committed to preventing formal Taiwanese independence? This
differs from an analysis of the CCP’s strategy regarding Taiwan, which can be more easily
determined (attempting to encourage reunification by making Taiwan dependent on China and
isolated from the rest of the world). Moreover, this research question differs from looking at the
surface level motivations behind such specific strategies. Rather, this research question looks at
the deeper, primary factors that motivate the CCP’s overall orientation toward Taiwan, and
specifically, its firm opposition to formal independence.
Literature Review
Despite what may appear to be agreement that deep nationalism drives Chinese foreign
policy toward Taiwan, the literature on the issue reveals serious divides. Three primary theories
emerge, each with distinct subgroups. The conventional approach sees the CCP’s deep
commitment to preventing independence as a “sacred commitment.” This theory adheres to the
nationalist narrative, and sees the commitment to Taiwan as primarily principled, or born out of
some sort of a-rational view of Taiwan’s cultural importance (Moore, 2016). Even among
scholars who agree that cultural considerations dominate, disagreement exists as to the precise
character of those considerations. Most simply, some argue that CCP leaders see Taiwan as a
historical part of China that can therefore never be separated from it (Mengin, 2020). Others
point to Taiwan’s specific history as the last refuge of the Chinese Nationalist Party, and
therefore see reunification as necessary to finally conclude the Chinese Civil War (Marschik,
2018). Still others contend that the Century of Humiliation gives Taiwan specific importance as
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an example of a piece of land that China has been denied control over by Westerners (Bergsten
et. al, 2009). Finally, some argue that the CCP overemphasizes the importance of Taiwan
because unification would unite the entire Han Chinese race under one government (Jacobs,
2008).
A second theoretical approach focuses on pragmatic international geopolitical concerns.
Such theorists frequently refer to Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier” and emphasize its
strategic importance for military operations (Nathan, 1996; Wallman, 2007). The potential
strategic advantages that come from holding Taiwan include preventing further American
containment, stronger positioning in the South China Sea, enhanced defensive naval capacity,
and key positioning in maritime trade routes (Marschik, 2018). Different scholars emphasize
different advantages in making the realist case for China’s commitment to Taiwan, with
potentially crucial implications.
A final theoretical approach sees the CCP commitment to Taiwan as driven by pragmatic
domestic considerations. Two clear branches of this thinking exist. The first version of the theory
contends that the CCP fears a domino effect, in which Tibetan, Uighur, and Mongolian secession
movements would be bolstered by the symbolic exit of Taiwan from China (Lee, 2011; Mengin,
2020). According to these theorists, Taiwanese independence would send a signal of CCP
weakness and inability to control its borders that would make holding the rest of the country
together nearly impossible. A second theory essentially contends that the Chinese public believes
in the nationalist perspective that Taiwan belongs to China and that allowing Taiwan to become
independent would be evidence of an inability of the CCP to govern effectively (Shirk, 2007).
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Knowing this, CCP leaders fear a legitimacy crisis and popular uprising in the event of
Taiwanese independence.
None of these theories are mutually exclusive, and some do contend that a combination
of factors play significant roles (Friedman, 2007). Yet the possibility for overlap should not
negate the real disagreement present in the literature. Adherents to the sacred commitments
theory tend to downplay the importance of security considerations and vice versa. This paper
intends to determine which factors really matter to China, and which cannot really explain the
extent and nature of the CCP’s opposition to Taiwanese independence.
Research Methodology
This paper proceeds using a two-part methodology. The paper relies primarily on the
secondary sources that make up the existing scholarly literature on the China-Taiwan
relationship. A majority of these sources come from the academic world, including multiple
books and quite a few academic journal articles. One book comes from a former US diplomat
who has since produced academic work, and a number of think tank reports have been consulted.
While nearly all of these sources come from the field of international relations, a few sources
from other disciplines, such as history, have been included.
The paper also relies on primary sources in the form of four qualitative interviews.
Experts were contacted via email on the basis of the relevance of their research interests. Efforts
were made to include experts from differing national perspectives due to the many parties with a
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stake in the China-Taiwan relationship. These efforts saw success, as interviews were conducted
with experts at universities in France, China, and the United States.
All interviewees received information on the nature of the research project before
agreeing to participate. Some interviewees requested to see the quotations that would be used
from their interviews and were provided with that information. No interviewee requested
anonymity, requested the exclusion of any of their comments, or raised any ethical concerns at
any point in the process.
This paper proceeds by categorizing the types of evidence that scholars have used to
assess Chinese motivations with regards to Taiwan. It then analyzes the quality of the evidence
supporting each of the different theories found in the literature. Finally, it concludes by assessing
the relative strength of each theory on the basis of the amassed evidence.
Analysis
Types of Evidence
Determining the underlying motivations that ground Chinese foreign policy represents a
uniquely difficult challenge. Often described as a “black box,” the Chinese foreign policy
decision-making process allows few opportunities for Western observers to even ascertain which
actors hold decision-making power, let alone the rationale those actors employ (James and
Zhang, 2005). In this opaque context, researchers must do their best to use what little clues they
have available to make educated guesses regarding Chinese motivations. While a litany of
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potential methodologies exist to support such guesswork, four types of evidence emerge in the
literature as most likely to yield glimmers of the truth.
First, researchers can look to rhetorical choices used in both the official public statements
and the private writings and conversations of Chinese leaders. Evidence derived from the actual
statements of Chinese officials has the advantage of offering the clearest and simplest window
into Chinese decision-making. Serious questions can and should be raised, however, regarding
the extent to which the public beliefs of Chinese leaders match their private beliefs. Because of
China’s one-party system, leaders essentially must tow the party line or abandon their political
future. In this context, claims about genuine Chinese motivations that attempt to use statements
as evidence can be grouped into three tiers of strength. The strongest claims derive from the rare
public statements that express views counter to the party orthodoxy, because the ulterior motive
of party conformity actually deters the speaker from making such statements. The next strongest
claims derive from private statements, where officials may feel more comfortable speaking
freely, although demands for conformity likely exist even behind closed doors. The weakest
claims derive from public statements that conform to party orthodoxy, although even these
statements should count as evidence particularly when specific phrases or words see frequent
repetition.
Second, researchers can look to expert evaluation. This methodology essentially boils
down to a form of intellectual modesty, recognizing that any individual researcher may be unable
to single-handling decipher Chinese motivation better than their peers. Additionally, solid
academic research supports the notion that “groups are remarkably intelligent, and are often
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smarter than the smartest people in them” (Suroweicki, 2005, pg. xiii). Specifically, Suroweicki
finds that aggregating group answers to complex questions, like what motivates China, yields
much more accurate results than taking any particular individual’s answer, no matter their
qualification.
Third, researchers can look to contextual factors. This approach sees the question of the
motivations grounding Chinese opposition to Taiwanese independence as far too narrow. Claims
that use this approach use evidence based on how China typically behaves and argues that China
probably behaves consistently with regard to Taiwan. For example, a scholar might argue that
China has a generally revisionist orientation to the liberal order and that its foreign policy toward
Taiwan must fit within its general revisionist orientation. The strength of claims derived from
context depends heavily on the strength of the corresponding claim about context. If extremely
strong evidence can be shown that Chinese leaders exhibit a generally pragmatic worldview,
claims that China regards Taiwan ideologically would be significantly weakened. Even the
strongest contextual claims cannot be considered conclusive, however, because they fail to
account for the specific features of the Taiwan dispute, which has several unique characteristics
that differentiate from all other policy areas.
Fourth, researchers can make inferences regarding motivations that derive from actions.
Inferential evidence analyzes the strategic choices that China has made with regards to Taiwan,
and attempts to determine what motivation sets would justify those choices. This evidence can be
a powerful tool to rule out particular theories, as it can demonstrate a clear inconsistency
between a potential motivation and actual behavior. Inferential evidence rarely can provide
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positive proof for a particular theory, however, as multiple motivation sets could plausibly justify
nearly any action. Furthermore, inferential evidence requires researchers to impose a certain
view of rationality onto China, because researchers must use their personal judgment to
determine which actions would be consistent with a given motivation.
The Conventional View
The conventional view on the motivations grounding CCP’s opposition to formal
Taiwanese independence contends that its leaders adhere to a nationalist belief that Taiwan is
rightfully a part of China. Every different scholar understands the ideology behind this
nationalism slightly differently. Some emphasize China’s belief in Taiwan has historically been a
part of China (Mengin, 2020), others emphasize retaking Taiwan as the final piece required to
finish the Chinese Civil War (Jacques, 2009; Marschik, 2018), still others emphasize Taiwan’s
role in the Century of Humiliation (Bergsten et al., 2009), and a final group emphasizes racial
unity (Jacobs, 2008). Despite disagreeing over the emphasis of these factors, almost all of these
scholars would agree that each plays at least some role in Taiwan’s particular place in Chinese
nationalism.
Rhetorical Evidence
Because the nationalist theory closely mirrors the official Chinese explanation for its
opposition to Taiwanese independence, it’s no surprise that official Chinese statements largely
support this theory. Moore (2016) cites seven different instances in which Chinese leaders,
including Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin, made a statement on the Taiwan issue that justified
China’s interest in Taiwan on nationalist grounds. Specifically, Moore found that Chinese
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leaders frequently referred to reunification as a “sacred commitment,” a loose ideological
concept that he sees as unifying the various different strands of nationalist concern for Taiwan.
Current President Xi Jinping appeared to espouse the same core philosophy in a 2019 speech in
which he claimed that “unification between the two sides of the strait is the great trend of
history” (Buckley and Horton, 2019). The evidence from official public statements seems to
unequivocally support the nationalist theory. All of this rhetorical evidence, however, is of the
weakest kind as it exclusively consists of public statements that adhere to party orthodoxy.
Expert Evidence
The nationalist theory appears to be the closest theory to achieving expert consensus.
Moore interviewed 28 Chinese experts on cross-strait relations and asked them to assign
percentages of emphasis to the different motivations of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan.
Experts could, for example, put 80% of their emphasis on desires to end the Century of
Humiliation and 20% on desires to achieve better access to maritime trade routes. Moore found
that experts gave 49.4% of the total emphasis to nationalist motivations, significantly more than
any other factor. Moore (2020) claims that one fourth of his sample of experts were “people who
would be in the room at the PRC” while the other three quarters were “academics with their ears
to the ground.” Moore did not quantitatively measure whether the government officials gave
significantly different answers from the academics, but he says that the both groups primarily
emphasized nationalist motivations.
Although Moore classifies the government officials as experts, their responses really
provide private rhetorical evidence than expert evidence. Moore never identifies the identities of
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his interviewees, so the government officials may have felt relatively capable of speaking freely,
although they may still have felt some pressure to tow the party line either because they feared
their responses would be discovered or because of a genuine desire to propagate the official
narrative. As such, the responses from government officials should be understood as equivalent
to evidence of the private conversations of government officials: medium strength rhetorical
evidence.
The academic responses fit much more cleanly as expert evidence. These academics, all
based in China, probably have access to some information and cultural understanding that
Western observers lack. Moreover, their relative uniformity provides evidence that the
nationalist theory is not only the conventional view, but the consensus view. Finally, the
aggregation of their responses into a single average serves as exactly the type of group
knowledge production that Suroweicki contends produces better results than individualized
analysis.
Contextual Evidence
Some fairly strong contextual evidence supports the nationalism theory. One broad
perspective contends that China must be seen as a civilization-state rather than a nation-state
(Jacques, 2009). Jacques writes that “when the Chinese use the term ‘China’ they are not usually
referring to the country or nation so much as Chinese civilization – its history, the dynasties,
Confucius...and distinctive philosophy” (pg. 196). Viewing China as a civilization-state means
that “China” did not begin with the founding of the PRC in 1949, but with the founding of the
Zhou dynasty thousands of years ago. This classification has profound implications for its
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modern day policy-making. Jacques notes that because the Chinese adopt this unique
civilizational perspective, “there are no other people in the world who are so connected to their
past” (pg. 197). The civilizational perspective creates a continuous view of Chinese history,
amplifying the importance of historical China in the psyche of the Chinese people. The
civilizational perspective also comes with a particular conception of the role of the state. Within
a civilization-state, “the state, most importantly of all, has the sacred task of maintaining the
unity of Chinese civilization” (pg. 199).
Viewed through the lens of the civilization-state, the nationalist narrative becomes
extremely clear. Both the emphasis on the historical continuity of the Chinese civilization and
the state’s primary goal of preserving unity make Taiwanese independence an absolute travesty
from a civilization-state perspective. Indeed, Jacques adheres to the nationalist theory.
Specifically, he believes the CCP sees Taiwan as “unfinished business, the only incomplete item
on the Party’s civil war agenda” (pg. 299). According to Jacques, the historical conflict around
China amplifies Taiwan’s status as a lost territory and therefore a threat to the state's primary
objective of maintaining unity.
The International Geostrategy Theory
In a sharp break from the nationalist theory, the international geostrategy theory views
CCP leaders as eminently pragmatic. Adherents argue that Chinese leaders value Taiwan
primarily because of its inherent geostrategic value. Just as proponents of the nationalist theory
disagree about the precise reason that Taiwan attracts nationalist fervor, different explanations
for the primary geostrategic value of Taiwan exist as well. Common explanations include
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China’s desire to use Taiwan as a bridgehead to achieve broader regional hegemony in the
Asia-Pacific, as a buffer against American containment, as an access point to maritime trade
routes, and as an enabler of breakout capacity for its submarine fleet. The most prominent
proponent of the international geostrategy theory actually contends that all of these factors play a
role, and add up to making Taiwan an essential geographic resource for China (Wachman, 2007).
Rhetorical Evidence
Wachman provides by far the strongest defense of the international geostrategy theory
in the literature, and he builds his case on rhetorical evidence. Citing a litany of PLA officials, he
shows that the Chinese military has thought long and hard about the strategic value of Taiwan.
For example, he cites Major General Peng Guangqian of the PRC Academy of Military Sciences
as saying “Taiwan is a keystone for China to cross the Pacific and go out to the world. It is an
important strategic space that affects national security and national rejuvenation, and affects
China’s external transformational links, trade links, and oil energy transportation links” (pg.
144). He also cites Lou Yuan, a Senior Colonel at the PRC Academy of Military Sciences,
claiming that “only the seas to the east of Taiwan allow China direct access to the great strategic
passages of the Pacific. If this opening to the sea is controlled by other countries, China’s
maritime development strategy will be severely hampered. However, if the two sides of the
straight unify...China’s maritime development strategy will vigorously flourish and rise.” (pg.
30). These two excerpts represent only a small selection of Wachman’s rigorous research, which
fairly conclusively shows that the PLA has extensively examined the benefits of controlling
Taiwan.
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At a first glance, the rhetorical evidence for the international geostrategy theory far
exceeds the rhetorical evidence for the nationalist theory. Because the international geostrategy
theory does not conform to the official party line, and perhaps even runs afoul of it, the evidence
from the PLA should be treated as highly genuine. Yet at the end of his book, Wachman makes a
concession in the name of modesty that ultimately undermines much of his work:
One can be fairly certain that the most senior leaders in the PRC are well acquainted with
the geostrategic arguments that are advanced about the centrality of Taiwan and its
salience as a means of puncturing the U.S. island-based cordon. One does not know,
though, whether it is the logic of that argument or some other that impels them to
coercive diplomatic measures and an increasingly militarized stance toward Taiwan. One
cannot know whether they are moved primarily by the nationalistic arguments that have
been the mainstay of the PRC’s declaratory policy or whether they...see the quest for
sovereignty and territorial integrity as a means to grander strategic ends” (pg. 160).
Wachman deserves credit for honestly admitting what his evidence fails to prove. Yet this caveat
is no mere asterisk at the end of his work, but a devastating concession. Wachman quotes almost
exclusively from the PLA, rather than the PRC broadly, and provides no evidence that the PLA
has shaped broader policy-making. Although the PLA undoubtedly wields tremendous influence,
the exclusion of other decision-makers creates a clear bias toward the military justifications for
taking Taiwan. The PLA would be negligent if they did not investigate the strategic concerns
surrounding Taiwan, and simply noting that they have done so extensively does not amount to
much of an argument that such concerns constitute primary drivers of policy.
Expert Evidence
Although no corollary to Moore’s quantitative study of expert attitudes exists among
advocates of international geostrategy theory, a significant number of scholars have voiced
support for the Wachman’s thesis. Cole (2008), reviewing Wachman’s book, notes that
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“Wachman does succeed in demonstrating that many of China’s current military strategists, both
academics and military officers, view Taiwan’s importance in geostrategic terms.” Kastner
(2010) adds that “Wachman does an outstanding job of weaving together a narrative showing
that strategic concerns have often factored into debates and decisions concerning Taiwan.” Most
enthusiastically, Nathan (2008) gushes that “Alan Wachman's answer to this puzzle is the most
persuasive I have seen.” While nearly all these reviewers have some reservations about aspects
of Wachman’s argument, some experts clearly do share Wachman’s overall view that
international geostrategic concerns dominate.
Contextual Evidence
Contextual evidence does exist to support the international geopolitics theory, although
its claims have been highly contested. Some scholars argue that China exhibits the characteristics
of an offensive realist state, meaning that it acts aggressively in order to preserve its own security
(Li, 2016; Mearshimer, 2015). If offensive realism does characterize China, then China would be
expected to view international conflicts through the lens of its potential strategic gains and
vulnerabilities. Realism would invalidate the nationalist view because it entails a purely
pragmatic and non-ideological outlook. While it would not necessarily refute the domestic
politics theory, realism would suggest that China sees international threats as larger obstacles to
its survival.
This theory has many detractors, however. Meijer (2020) says that “China is not a
revisionist power. Beijing is not trying to overthrow the system. Rather, China is engaged in a
selective contestation of the international order in the Asia-Pacific and in general.” China has
indeed participated in a number of multilateral agreements and benefited greatly from the
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international order that it participates in. The realist worldview appears highly reductive and has
difficulty explaining many of modern China’s behaviors. Still, as a prominent theory in
international relations that would greatly support the international geostrategy theory, it deserves
consideration.
The Domestic Politics Theory
The third and final theory contends that the CCP’s opposition to Taiwanese independence
hinges not on foreign policy at all, but on domestic concerns. At first glance, the theory has much
in common with the nationalist theory, because domestic politics theory proponents agree that
the Chinese population as a whole holds deeply nationalist attitudes toward Taiwan. Whereas the
nationalist theory holds that Chinese leadership shares those attitudes, the domestic politics
theory envisions Chinese leadership as pragmatists who see their CCP rule as deeply threatened
by a public backlash to letting Taiwan secede. As with both other theories, different scholars
defend slightly different versions of the theory. One version of the theory, which could be
described as the “domino theory,” holds that Chinese leaders fear that formal Taiwanese
independence could send a signal of CCP weakness that would foment further secessionist
movements in other border territories (Lee, 2009; Friedman, 2011; Mengin, 2020). Scholars most
frequently cite Tibet and Xinjiang as potential areas of concern, although Chinese leaders may
also worry about Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, and Macao.
A second version of the domestic politics theory might be called the “legitimacy theory.”
The legitimacy theory contends that the CCP believes that the broader legitimacy of their rule
would evaporate if it failed to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. Proponents of this
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theory tend to see the potential legitimacy crisis posed by Taiwan as a self-fulfilling prophecy
fueled by previous generations of Chinese leaders. Friedman (2007) describes Mao and
subsequent leaders ratcheting up nationalism targeted at Taiwan in order to distract from the
CCP’s domestic troubles. Although Mao privately admitted that Taiwan did not historically
belong to China, “a certain level of military tensions served Mao's interests...He wanted to keep a
civil war alive” (pg. 122). This policy of using Taiwan as a diversion from domestic troubles
continued beyond Mao. Ultimately, Friedman argues that “virtually all analysts agree, the CCP
responded to a legitimation crisis by manufacturing causes for patriotic support. Taiwan, as in
1958, was targeted to serve domestic CCP purposes” (pg. 126). Unfortunately for the CCP,
continually justifying its legitimacy on the basis of the Taiwan issue has predictably made its
claim to legitimacy entirely dependent on the success of the party’s Taiwan policy. The
population has fully bought into the CCP’s manufactured narrative that the primary purpose of
the Chinese state is uniting China with Taiwan. Friedman writes that during the 1990’s, “power
holders in Beijing were continually under pressure to do more against Taiwan” (pg. 128). Such
pressures continued into the twenty-first century and made it impossible for CCP leaders to back
down: “Hu Jintao has had little room for maneuver in the direction of peace. ‘No Chinese leader
wants to risk being accused of 'losing' Taiwan on his watch’” (pg. 132). While not all adherents
to the legitimacy theory see the historical progression exactly as Friedman does, the broad story
of a manufactured legitimacy crisis aptly characterizes the theory’s main thesis.
Rhetorical Evidence
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Broadly speaking, public official rhetoric provides neither evidence for nor against the
domestic politics theory. The domestic politics theory would expect to see nearly all public
official rhetoric espousing the nationalist theory, because leaders have to uphold their image of
defending and promoting Chinese nationalism. Yet because such rhetoric also obviously supports
the nationalist theory itself, public official rhetoric provides little help to scholars deciding
between the nationalist theory and the domestic politics theory. Glaser (2020) still sees a glimpse
of evidence in Xi Jinping’s speech at the National Party Congress. In the speech, Xi directly
linked unification with Taiwan to “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xinhua, 2017).
Xi has predicted his defense of CCP stability on achieving that rejuvenation, and so Glaser sees
that linkage as potential evidence that Xi sees unification with Taiwan as necessary for CCP
legitimacy.
Shirk (2007) provides access to some private CCP rhetoric that strongly bolsters domestic
politics theory. She interviewed two retired anonymous PLA officers about their worries
stemming from a potential declaration of independence, and quotes one as saying “people have
very strong feelings about the Taiwan issue. If leaders stand by and do nothing while Taiwan
declares independence, the Chinese Communist Party will fall” (pg. 181). Notably, these officers
actually tried to brainstorm ways that China could justify backing down, implying strongly that if
not for domestic pressures, they would be happy to let Taiwan secede. Such statements provide
nearly incontrovertible evidence that the domestic politics theory describes the mindset of at
least these two officers. Shirk only interviews three PLA officers, however, and like Wachman,
fails to show that their thinking has any influence in the broader PRC policy-making realm. Due
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to that failure, rhetoric does not provide much evidence for the domestic politics theory more
broadly.
Expert Evidence
Although Moore’s study of expert opinion primarily supports the nationalist theory, it
also provides some solace to defenders of the domestic politics theory. Moore found 28.5% of
the experts’ emphasis was placed on the domestic politics theory (21.2% for the legitimacy
theory; 7.3% for the domino theory) in comparison to the 49.4% for the nationalist theory. When
asked about how he interprets the steep division, he says that he “expects to see that complexity
as a constructionist because that's the way the social milieu really is” (Moore 2020). Although
that complexity certainly should not be downplayed, these results might also be interpreted as
somewhat inconclusive. Moore chooses to bundle all the different strands of nationalist theory
into one quantitative category, while separating two different versions of the domestic politics
theory. If Moore had individually measured all four different versions of the nationalist theory,
he might have found none achieved greater emphasis than the 21.2% of emphasis for the
legitimacy theory. Moore’s paper argues that the concept of “sacred commitments” unites the
different strains of the nationalist theory and justifies their grouping, but one could also argue
that concepts like “pragmatism” unite even the domestic politics theory and the international
geostrategy theory. If the debate is conceived of as sacred commitments vs. pragmatism, both
interpreted broadly, pragmatism likely accounts for over 50% of the emphasis (although 12% of
the emphasis is unaccounted for in Moore’s paper).
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Unlike Moore, Shirk does not attempt a quantitative or aggregative survey of China
observers. She does, however, quote nine different experts who defend the domestic politics
theory in some fashion. Additionally, three of the experts contacted for this paper supported the
domestic politics theory (Glaser, 2020; Mengin, 2020; Meijer, 2020). The interviewees for this
paper were not selected randomly, and Shirk may have omitted quotations from interviewees that
defended other theories. Still, significant expert support for the domestic politics theory clearly
exists.
Contextual Evidence
Strong contextual evidence supports the domestic politics theory. Zhao (2008) describes
Chinese leadership as adopting a philosophy of pragmatic nationalism. This philosophy
“does not have a fixed, objectified, and eternally defined content, nor is it driven by any
ideology, religion beliefs or other abstract ideas. It is an instrument of the communist
state to bolster faith of the Chinese people in a political system in trouble and hold the
country together during the period of rapid and turbulent transformation from a
communist to a post-communist society” (Zhao, 2008, pg. 3).
Zhao seeks to support this account of Chinese pragmatic nationalism with an appeal to history.
He interprets Deng Xiaoping’s famous quote, that “a cat, whether it is white or black, is a good
one as long as it is able to catch mice”, as pragmatism epitomized. Deng rejected ideological
communism and instead advocated pragmatic market reforms that transformed China into an
economic powerhouse. Zhao cites numerous modern cases of Chinese leaders choosing a
pragmatic option over strict ideological adherence in foreign policy contexts. In one particularly
illuminating example from 2001, after a US plane collided into a Chinese plane, the Chinese
government took a strong public stance demanding an apology to stave off domestic nationalist
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pressures. The US Secretary of State used the phrase “very sorry” to reflect that he found the
situation regrettable, but did not actually apologize for the incident. Chinese leaders intentionally
misinterpreted the phrase and accepted the non-apology, demonstrating their demand for an
apology had been an act of pragmatic domestic politics rather than genuine nationalist anger.
Yeung (2019) adds further context to this view, showing that the CCP has frequently and
consciously stoked nationalism to achieve legitimacy. Like all authoritarian regimes, the CCP
faces the difficult task of justifying its rule to the public. Yeung argues that the CCP has
historically relied on ideological legitimacy derived from communism and performance
legitimacy derived from economic growth. Eventually, however, “in view of the shortcomings of
both ideological legitimacy and performance legitimacy, the CCP regime realised that
nationalism is the strongest weapon in legitimising its rule over the country” (Yeung, 2019).
Yeung applies this broader thesis about the CCP’s operational style to Taiwan. Like Friedman,
he traces CCP’s historical construction of both Chinese unity generally and Taiwanese
reunification specifically as key elements of nationalism. He then concludes that the CCP
opposes independence because it “translates to the CCP’s failure in unifying the territory and
thus undermines the CCPs’ nationalist legitimacy” (Yeung, 2019).
Meijer (2020) and Mengin provide a similar account of the broader forces that dictate
Chinese foreign policy. Meijer says that “the main goals [of foreign policy] are domestic goals.
Ensuring the survival of the CCP and ensuring its continued legitimacy and stability; but other
goals follow from this. One is ensuring territorial integrity - this applies to Taiwan, Xinjiang and
Hong Kong and, to some extent, to territorial disputes in the South China Sea.” Meijer describes
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not only Taiwan policy, but all Chinese foreign policy as primarily motivated by CCP concerns
about legitimacy. Mengin similarly claims that “the main goal [of Chinese foreign policy] is to
achieve domestic social stability.” These claims can essentially be seen as an affirmation of the
pragmatic nationalist narrative. Zhao, Yeung, Mengin, and Meijer all agree that Chinese
leadership, deeply concerned about its domestic vulnerability, crafts pragmatic strategies
centered on stoking nationalism in order to quell domestic dissent. In doing so, it creates
inviolable commitments for itself, such as the prevention of Taiwanese formal independence and
ultimately reunification.
Inferential Evidence
Inferential evidence requires somewhat different treatment from the other forms of
evidence. While each piece of rhetorical, expert, and contextual evidence directly supports one
theory or another, inferential evidence often refutes theories rather than supporting them.
Because inferential evidence primarily serves to challenge theories, this paper proceeds by
assessing how well different theories can account for a variety of different actions that China has
taken in the past and present.
Other Territorial Disputes
China disputes a wide variety of other territories besides Taiwan. In fact, China has been
embroiled in at least twenty-three territorial disputes since 1949 (Fravel, 2005). Although some
of these disputes, like the East and South China disputes, may be considered among China’s core
interests, they do not rise to the level of Taiwan. Wachman contrasts Taiwan with other
territorial disputes, noting that “one does not regularly read or hear, for instance, that the future
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of China’s ‘rise’ and development depends on recovering sovereignty over Diaoyutai, the islands
in the South China Sea, or the territory that India governs as part of the state of Arunachal
Pradesh” (pg. 29). On the contrary, China has actually reached a peaceful settlement in seventeen
of its twenty-three disputes, often ceding more than half of the contested territory (Fravel, 2005).
Clearly, China values Taiwan significantly over most of its other contested territories. A
plausible theory of China’s opposition to Taiwanese independence must be able to account for
that behavioral difference.
Although Wachman brings intention to this difference, the international geostrategy
theory greatly struggles to explain China’s unique insistence in the Taiwan dispute. Although
Wachman makes a convincing case that Taiwan holds strategic value, surely other disputed
territories do as well. In particular, the South China Sea holds tremendous strategic value, both as
a military access point and an economic hub. Ott (2019) calls its maritime routes “the busiest,
most important, maritime waterways in the world.” The vast reserves of oil in its waters could
help China reduce its dependency on trade routes that flow through the US-controlled Strait of
Malacca. China clearly recognizes this value, as it has acted aggressively to gain control of the
contested islands, spending millions on artificial islands and ignoring international rulings. Still,
as Wachman makes clear, Chinese leadership does not place Taiwan-level existential emphasis
on the South China Sea dispute despite its importance. The international geostrategy theory lacks
a compelling explanation for Taiwan’s singular status as non-negotiable for the CCP.
Other territorial disputes pose an intriguing difficulty for certain versions of the
nationalist theory as well. China has proved consistently willing to negotiate and even cede
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territory taken by what China considers to be “unequal treaties,” wherein other nations forced the
Qing dynasty to give up its territory after military defeats (Fravel, 2005). Fravel argues that this
willingness shows a weakness in the nationalist theory: “For constructivists, the legacy of
"unequal treaties" that ceded land to foreign powers in the nineteenth century and the central role
of national unification in modern Chinese history suggest that conflicts over territory should be
highly salient for China's leaders and basically non-negotiable” (pg. 47). China’s surprising
willingness to back down in most other territorial disputes creates a problem particularly for
versions of the nationalist theory that center on China’s historic claim to Taiwan or the island’s
role in the Century of Humiliation. The unequal treaties ought to trigger the same historical
memory of the Century of Humiliation that Taiwan does, and any territory at all should be
sacrosanct if historical claims provide the main justification for the nationalist theory.
Claims that center on the unfinished business of the Chinese Civil War remain entirely
consistent with China’s behavior in other territorial disputes, as Chiang Kai-Shek did not flee
anywhere but Taiwan. The racial unity case may even be strengthened by China’s behavior in
other cases, as nearly all border areas under dispute have non-Han Chinese ethnic majorities.
Meanwhile, China’s claims to Han majority Hong Kong and Macao in the late 1990’s more
closely mirror the fervor of China’s claim to Taiwan. The domestic politics theory also easily
explains the difference between China’s claim to Taiwan and to other territories. Advocates
would argue that the CCP spent half a century drumming up nationalist sentiment toward
Taiwan, but not other islands. As a result, domestic political pressures do not require the CCP to
fervently defend its other claims.
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De Facto Independence vs. De Jure Independence
Taiwan enjoys full de facto independence from China. Despite not claiming formal
independence, “it is administratively separate from China in either case, with its own
government, its own currency, its own military” (Moore, 2016). Although China exercises
absolutely no control over Taiwan under status quo conditions, it clearly considers de jure
independence to be a much, much worse outcome. China frequently claims that it would resort to
forceful unification should Taiwan declare formal independence. Mengin claims that under no
circumstances would China fail to follow through on that promise. Glaser goes even further,
claiming that “China would mount a response under virtually any circumstance even if they felt
they didn't have the military capability, even if they believed the US would intervene and they
would be defeated. They would have to mount the response to show their people that the party
was defending Chinese sovereignty.” In the mind of Chinese leaders, de facto independence
seems oddly closer to actual Chinese control than it does than to de jure independence.
The international geostrategy theory has no real way to explain this distinction. For
strategic purposes, de facto independence represents no difference from de jure independence.
One might argue that de jure independence closes the door on future unification, while de facto
independence plays into the long-term strategy of the CCP. That explanation might justify
Chinese statements on forceful reunification as a bluff, but not as a genuine strategy. Actually
invading Taiwan because of a change in nomenclature would never fit the logic espoused by the
international geostrategy theory, but both experts insist that China would do so.
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The difference between de facto and de jure independence also provides a difficult
challenge for the nationalist theory. The nationalist theory needs to develop an understanding of
Chinese nationalism that justifies the claim that official independence wrongs China more deeply
than de facto independence. Most of the plausible versions of the nationalist theory do not
provide such a justification. The legacy of the Chinese Civil War and the Century of Humiliation
cannot possibly serve as the explanation, because the anger elicited by those historical wrongs
stems from Taiwan’s current unofficial independence. De jure independence would not in any
way worsen the offense of the Century of Humiliation, which supposedly already robbed China
of Taiwan, nor render the already-unfinished Chinese Civil War any less finished. Racial unity
does not seem a promising candidate either, as the Han Chinese still find themselves separated
by very real immigration and border restrictions. No theory of nationalism can adequately
explain why China would consider formal independence to be any worse than informal
independence.
The nationalism theory could fall back on the same argument advanced by the
international geostrategy theory: opposition to independence stems from its foreclosure of future
unification. This argument deserves consideration, although not a single expert or academic
source appears to support it. The theory would have to admit that China sees no actual difference
between the status quo and formal independence, but rather just the loss of a future opportunity.
This understanding would be quite different from actual Chinese rhetoric, which emphasizes that
formal evidence would represent a genuine and distinct separation from the status quo. In
contrast to the contrived version of the nationalist theory that can explain this difference, the
domestic politics theory easily explains why de jure independence receives special attention.
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Because the symbolic act of formal independence would be widely perceived within China, and
because the CCP has spent years promising to prevent such independence, the domestic
pressures to act would be enormous.
Conclusion
After reviewing all of the evidence for and against each theory, nobody can be surprised
that a scholarly consensus has not yet emerged. Conclusions can still be reached, however. The
international geostrategy theory has little to recommend it. Strong rhetorical evidence exists that
the PLA has considered the geostrategic value of Taiwan, but no evidence suggests that such
considerations have played a decisive role in policy-making. The theory enjoys the least support
from experts and has the weakest contextual claims to back it up. Worse, the inferential evidence
strongly suggests that the international geostrategy theory cannot explain China’s behavior.
China’s willingness to acquiescence in other strategically important disputes and its firm
insistence that formal independence would mark a significant departure from the status quo
cannot be reconciled with the international geostrategy theory’s core tenets.
Deciding between the nationalism theory and the domestic politics theory presents much
thornier issues. Neither theory has particularly strong rhetorical evidence in its favor. The
nationalist public rhetoric from Chinese leaders matches the expectation of both theories, and
while Shirk has shown that some Chinese officials adhere to the domestic politics theory
privately, no rhetorical evidence suggests that such adherence is widespread. Expert evidence
provides the strongest case for the nationalist theory. Moore’s quantitative study of 28 different
Chinese experts showed that experts considered nationalist explanations of China’s actions to be
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stronger than any other explanation. Still, the small sample size suggests that interpreters should
approach the study cautiously, especially since Shirk found at least nine experts who explicitly
affirmed the domestic politics theory. Ultimately, the expert evidence shows fairly clearly that
the nationalist theory enjoys more popularity among experts, but far from uniform acceptance.
The domestic politics theory appears to be the clear runner up, and has enough support that
scholars probably should not simply differ to the nationalist theory out of humility or respect for
consensus.
The contextual evidence forms the beginnings of the real case for the domestic politics
theory. Friedman, Yeung, Mengin, and Meijer all tell a similar historical narrative in which CCP
leaders have historically weaponized nationalism to distract from domestic crises and found
themselves forced to later act on that nationalism. These scholars make a persuasive case for this
historical account, and back up their theory with well-researched examples and evidence.
Furthermore, Zhao’s similarly high-quality research shows that Chinese leaders have a
propensity to adopt pragmatic attitudes toward nationalism, using it as a tool rather than blindly
following it as an ideology. These narratives both make the legitimacy theory appear to fit like a
puzzle piece into the broader context of Chinese politics and shed doubt on a theory that claims
Chinese leaders act on the basis of strict ideological commitment. The civilization-state theory
that grounds the nationalist theory, while persuasive in its own right, does little to suggest that
the domestic policy theory might be incorrect. The civilization-state theory focuses primarily on
the attitudes of the Chinese populous rather than its leaders, and so its conclusion that Chinese
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citizens see unity as the primary goal of government arguably bolsters the legitimacy theory
rather than detracting from it.
Finally, the inferential evidence strongly favors the domestic politics theory over the
nationalism theory. While some versions of the nationalist theory can explain the difference
between Taiwan and other territorial disputes, some of the most salient, like appeals to the
Century of Humiliation, are contradicted. China’s obsession with the difference between de facto
and de jure independence is not irreconcilable with the natioanlist theory either, but it forces a
series of mental leaps and contortions in order to render the theory coherent. On the other hand,
the domestic politics theory easily explains both, as the CCP has historically crafted a nationalist
narrative, now accepted by the public, expliciting and specifically concerning Taiwanese
independence.
Ultimately, this paper concludes that the domestic politics theory correctly identifies the
key driver of China’s opposition to Taiwan. Chinese leadership is not monolithic, and both
nationalism and geostrategy surely do play a role for some leaders. Domestic politics, however,
are both necessary and sufficient to explain the vast majority of China’s attitudes and actions
toward Taiwan. Within the domestic politics theory, the legitimacy theory appears to enjoy far
more support both from experts and the contextual evidence. While fears of domino secession
may be a part of what the CCP fears from a Taiwanese independence movement, general
discontent probably plays a much bigger role.
This conclusion has huge implications for policy-making and future research.
Policy-makers in the US should be wary that domestic political concerns take precedence over
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international strategic factors, and attempts to deal with China on a purely internationalist level
will fail. On the other hand, understanding that domestic politics underlie China’s concern with
Taiwan opens up huge opportunities as well. Policy-makers in the US should realize that when
attempting to persuade China to back down with regards to Taiwan, they need to allow China to
save face domestically. The US can begin to strategize on how to reach agreements with China
that give the perception of Chinese projection of strength but in reality ease tensions. The US
should also realize that attempting to slow Chinese economic growth poses a real risk because it
renders performance legitimacy non-viable for the CCP, and forces the CCP to stoke further
nationalist sentiment toward Taiwan. To deter further crises, the US should try to ensure that
CCP is not forced to strike Taiwan or fear losing its hold on power.
Future research can illuminate many of the questions raised here much further.
Additional surveys of experts should be conducted to attempt to clarify the breakdown of expert
opinion without any grouping mechanisms (different strands of nationalism theory should be
kept separate). More research could also be done with regards to the version of the nationalist
theory that attempts to adapt to the challenge posed by the importance of de jure independence.
Researchers should interview Chinese officials, experts, and citizens who express nationalist
sentiments to find out if they see de facto independence and de jure independence as
fundamentally different and why. This research, depending on the result, could save the
nationalist theory or put the final nail in its coffin.
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Chinese Communist Party = CCP
People’s Liberation Army = PLA
People’s Republic of China = PRC
United States of America = US or U.S.
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